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Abstract
We consider the use of no-regret algorithms to compute equilibria for particular classes of convex-
concave games. While standard regret bounds would lead to convergence rates on the order of
O(T−1/2), recent work (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013b; Syrgkanis et al., 2015) has established
O(1/T ) rates by taking advantage of a particular class of optimistic prediction algorithms. In
this work we go further, showing that for a particular class of games one achieves a O(1/T 2)
rate, and we show how this applies to the Frank-Wolfe method and recovers a similar bound
(Garber and Hazan, 2015). We also show that such no-regret techniques can even achieve a lin-
ear rate, O(exp(−T )), for equilibrium computation under additional curvature assumptions.
Keywords: Online learning, zero-sum games, Frank-Wolfe, fast rates
1. Introduction
A large number of core problems in statistics, optimization, and machine learning, can be framed
as the solution of a two-player zero-sum game. Linear programs, for example, can be viewed as
a competition between a feasibility player, who selects a point in Rn, and a constraint player that
aims to check for feasibility violations (Adler, 2013). Boosting (Freund and Schapire, 1999) can
be viewed as the competition between an agent that selects hard distributions and a weak learning
oracle that aims to overcome such challenges (Freund and Schapire, 1996). The hugely popular
technique of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), which produce
implicit generative models from unlabelled data, has been framed in terms of a repeated game, with
a distribution player aiming to produce realistic samples and a discriminative player that seeks to
distinguish real from fake.
While many vanilla supervised learning problems reduce to finding the minimum of an objec-
tive function f(·) over some constraint set, tasks that require the search for a saddle point—that is,
min-max solution of some convex-concave payoff function g(·, ·)—don’t easily lend themselves to
standard optimization protocols such as gradient descent, Newton’s method, etc. It is not clear, for
example, whether successive iterates should even increase or decrease the payoff g. This issue has
been noticed in the training of GANs, for example, where the standard update method is a simulta-
neous gradient descent procedure, and many practitioners have raised concerns about cycling.
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On the other hand, what has emerged as a very popular and widely-used trick is the following:
simulate a pair of online learning algorithms, each competing in the game with the objective of
minimizing regret, and return the time-averaged sequence of actions taken by the players as an
approximate solution. The method of applying no-regret learning strategies to find equilibria in
zero-sum games was explored in Freund and Schapire (1999), yet the idea goes back at least as far
as work by Blackwell (1956) and Hannan (1957). This methodology has several major benefits,
which include the following. First, this framework “decouples” the optimization into two parallel
routines that have very little communication overhead. Second, the use of no-regret learning is
ideal in this scenario, as most of the guarantees for such algorithms are robust to even adversarial
environments. Third, one is able to bound the approximation error of the returned saddle point
simply in terms of the total regret of the two players. Finally, several surprising recent results have
suggested that this parallel online learning methodology leads to even stronger guarantees than
what the naı¨ve theory would tell you. In short, whereas the typical no-regret analysis would lead
to an approximation error of O(T−1/2) after T iterations, the use of optimistic learning strategies
(Chiang et al., 2012) can be shown to guarantee O(T−1) convergence; this technique was developed
by Rakhlin and Sridharan (2013a) and further expanded by Syrgkanis et al. (2015).
In this work we go further, showing that even faster rates are achievable for some specific cases
of saddle-point problems. In particular:
1. Abernethy and Wang (2017) observed that the optimization method known as Frank-Wolfe is
simply an instance of the above no-regret framework for solving a particular convex-concave
game, leading to a rate of O(T−1). In this work we further analyze the Frank-Wolfe game,
and show that when the objective function and constraint set have additional structure, and
both algorithms use optimistic learning procedures, then we can achieve a rate of O(T−2).
This generalizes a result of Garber and Hazan (2015) who proved a similar convergence rate
for Frank-Wolfe.
2. Additionally, we show that when the game payoff function is suitably curved in both inputs—
i.e. it is strongly-convex-concave and smooth—then we can use no-regret dynamics to achieve
a linear rate, with the error decaying as O(exp(−T )). Applying our technique to the Frank-
Wolfe game we are able to recover the linear rate results of Levitin and Polyak (1966); Demyanov and Rubinov
(1970) and Dunn (1979).
A notable aspect of our work is the combination of several key algorithmic techniques. First, our
Frank-Wolfe result relies on regularization using the squared gauge function, allowing the learner to
need only a single linear optimization call on each round. Second, we introduce a notion of weighted
regret minimization, and our rates depend on the careful selection of the weight schedule as well
as a careful analysis of what has been called Optimistic FollowTheRegularizedLeader. Third, our
linear convergence rate leans on a trick developed recently by Levy (2017) that generates an adaptive
weighting scheme based on the norm of the observed gradients.
1.1. Preliminaries
We first provide some definitions that are used in this paper. Let f : X 7→ R be some function.
Definition 1 A vector w is a subgradient of f at v for any u ∈ domf , f(u) ≥ f(v) + 〈w, u− v〉.
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Definition 2 f is L-smooth w.r.t. a norm ‖ ·‖ if f is everywhere differentiable and for any u, v ∈ X
f(u) ≤ f(v) + 〈∇f(v), u− v〉+ L2 ‖u− v‖2. An equivalent definition of smoothness is that f has
Lipschitz continuous gradient, i.e., ‖∇f(u)−∇f(v)‖∗ ≤ L‖u− v‖.
Definition 3 f is σ-strongly convex w.r.t. a norm ‖ · ‖ if for any u, v ∈ X , f(u) ≥ f(v) +
〈∇f(v), u− v〉+ σ2‖u− v‖2 for some constant σ > 0.
Definition 4 For a convex function f , its Fenchel conjugate is f∗(x) := sup
y∈domf
〈x, y〉 − f(y).
Note that if f is convex then so is its conjugate f∗, since it is defined as the maximum over linear
functions of x (Boyd (2004)). Morever, when the function f(·) is strictly convex and the above
supremum is attained, we have that∇f∗(x) = argmax
y
〈x, y〉−f(y). Furthermore, the biconjugate
f∗∗ equals f if and only if f is closed and convex. It is known that f is σ-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖
if and only if f∗ is 1/σ strongly smooth with respect to the dual norm ‖ · ‖∗ (Kakade et al. (2009)),
assuming that f is a closed and convex function.
Definition 5 A convex set K ⊆ Rd is a λ-strongly convex set w.r.t. a norm ‖ · ‖ if for any u, v ∈ K,
any θ ∈ [0, 1], the ‖ · ‖ ball centered at θu+ (1 − θ)v with radius θ(1 − θ)λ2‖u− v‖2 is included
in K. For examples of strongly-convex sets, we refer the readers to (Garber and Hazan, 2015).
Definition 6 Let K be any closed convex set which contains the origin. Then the gauge function of
K is γK(x) := inf{c ≥ 0 : xc ∈ K}
One can show that the gauge function is a convex function (e.g. Rockafellar (1996)). It is known that
several closed convex sets can lead to the same gauge function (Bach (2013)). But if a closed convex
setK contains the origin, then the gauge function is unique and one hasK = {x ∈ Rd : γK(x) ≤ 1}.
Furthermore, int K = {x ∈ Rd : γK(x) < 1}.
Next we provide a characterization of sets based on their gauge function.
Definition 7 (β-Gauge set) Let K be a closed convex set which contains the origin. We say that K
is β-Gauge if its squared gauge function, γ2K(·), is β-strongly-convex.
This property captures a wide class of constraints. Among these are lp balls, Schatten p balls, and
the Group (s, p) ball. We refer the reader to Appendix B for more details. Curiously, all of these
Gauge sets are also known to be strongly-convex. We conjecture that strong-convexity and the
Gauge property are equivalent.
2. Minimizing Regret to Solve Games
Let us now turn our attention to a now-classical trick: using sequential no-regret learning strategies
to find equilibria in zero-sum games.
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2.1. Weighted Regret Minimization
We begin by briefly defining the standard online learning setup. We imagine a learner who must
make a sequence of decisions, selecting at each round t a point xt that lies within a convex and
compact decision space K. After selecting xt she is charged ℓt(xt) for her action, where ℓt(·) is
the loss function in round t, and she proceeds to the next round. Typically it is assumed that when
the learner selects xt in round t, she has observed all loss functions ℓ1(·), . . . , ℓt−1(·) up to, but not
including, time t. However, we will also consider learners that are prescient, i.e. that can choose xt
with knowledge of the loss functions up to and including time t.
The standard objective for adversarial online learning is the regret, defined as the difference
between the learner’s loss over the sequence, discounted by the loss of the best fixed action in
hindsight. However, for the purposes of this paper we consider a generalized notion which we
call the weighted regret, where every time period has an importance weight that can differ from
round to round. More precisely, we assume that the learning process is characterized by a sequence
of weights α := α1, α2, . . . , αT , where αt > 0 for every t. Now we define the weighted regret
according to
α-REG :=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(xt)−minx∈X
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(x).
(Note that when we drop the α−, this implies that αt = 1 for all t). The sequence of αt’s can
arbitrary, and indeed we will consider scenarios under which these weights can be selected in an
online fashion, according to the observed loss sequence. The learners also observe αt at the end of
each round. Throughout the paper we will use At to denote the cumulative sum
∑t
s=1 αs, and of
particular importance will be the weighted average regret α-REG := α-REGAT .
2.2. Algorithms
In this section we present several of the classical, and a few more recent, algorithms with well-
established regret guarantees. For the most part, we present these algorithms in unweighted form,
without reference to the weight sequence α. In later sections we specify more precisely their
weighted counterparts.
One of the most well-known online learning strategies is known as FOLLOWTHEREGULAR-
IZEDLEADER (FTRL), in which the decision point xt is chosen as the “best” point over the pre-
vious loss functions, with some additional regularization penalty according to some convex R(·).
Precisely, given a parameter η > 0, the learner chooses on round t the point
xt = argminx∈K{η
∑t−1
s=1 ℓs(x) +R(x)}. (1)
For convenience, let ∇t be the gradient ∇ℓt(xt). If we assume that R(·) is a strongly convex
function with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖, then a well-known regret analysis grants the following
bound:
REGT ≤ Dη + η2
∑T
t=1 ‖∇t‖2∗, (2)
whereD := supx∈KR(x). With an appropriately-tuned η, one achieves REGT ≤
√
D
∑T
t=1 ‖∇t‖2∗,
which is O(
√
T ) as long the gradients have bounded norm. See, e.g., Shalev-Shwartz et al. (2012);
Hazan (2014); Rakhlin and Sridharan (2016) for further details on this analysis.
The FOLLOWTHELEADER (FTL) strategy minimizes the objective (1), but without the regular-
ization penalty; i.e. xt = argminx∈K
∑t−1
s=1 ℓs(x). Another way to formalize this is to consider
4
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η →∞. Given that the above bound has a 1η term, it is clear we can not simply apply the same anal-
ysis of FOLLOWTHEREGULARIZEDLEADER, and indeed one can find examples where linear regret
is unavoidable Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Shalev-Shwartz et al. (2012). On the other hand,
it has been shown that a strong regret guarantee is achievable even without regularization, as long
as the sequence of loss functions are strongly convex. In particular, Kakade and Shalev-Shwartz
(2009) show the following result:
Lemma 8 (Corollary 1 from Kakade and Shalev-Shwartz (2009)) Let ℓ1, ..., ℓT be a sequence
of functions such that for all t ∈ [T ], ℓt is σt-strongly convex. Assume that the FTL algorithm runs
on this sequence and for each t ∈ [T ], let vt be in ∂ℓt(xt). Then,∑T
t=1 ℓt(xt)−minx
∑T
t=1 ℓt(x) ≤ 12
∑T
t=1
‖vt‖2∑t
τ=1 στ
(3)
Furthermore, let G = maxt ‖vt‖ and assume that for all t ∈ [T ], σt ≥ σ. Then, the regret is
bounded by G
2
2σ (log(T ) + 1).
In the context of solving zero-sum games, the online learning framework allows for one of the two
players to be prescient, so she has access to one additional loss function ℓt(·) before selecting her
xt. In such a case it is much easier to achieve low regret, and we present three standard prescient
algorithms:
BESTRESPONSE xt = argminx∈K ℓt(x), (4)
BETHELEADER xt = argminx∈K
∑t
s=1 ℓs(x), (5)
BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER xt = argminx∈K
∑t
s=1 ℓs(x) +
1
ηR(x). (6)
Indeed it is easy to show that, for the first two of these prescient strategies, one easily obtains
REGT ≤ 0 (Kalai and Vempala, 2005b). The regret of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER is no more
than 1η supx,x′∈KR(x) − R(x′). We also consider optimistic algorithms, which we discuss in Ap-
pendix A.
Gauge Function FTRL. While the analysis of FOLLOWTHEREGULARIZEDLEADER is natural
and leads to a simple intuitive bound (2), it requires solving a non-linear optimization problem on
each round even when the loss functions ℓt(·) are themselves linear – a very common scenario.
From a computational perspective, it is often impractical to solve the FOLLOWTHEREGULAR-
IZEDLEADER objective. Nevertheless, in many scenarios a (computationally feasible) linear op-
timization oracle is at hand. In such instances, much attention has been focused on a perturbed ver-
sion of FOLLOWTHELEADER, where one solves the unregularized optimization problem but with
a linear noise term added to the objective; there is much work analyzing these algorithms and we
refer the reader to Kalai and Vempala (2005b); Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Abernethy et al.
(2014) among many others. The main downside of such randomized approaches is that they have
good expected regret but suffer in variance, which makes them less suitable in various reductions.
In this work, we introduce a family of FOLLOWTHEREGULARIZEDLEADER algorithms that
rely solely on a linear oracle, and we believe this is a novel approach to online linear optimization
problems. The restriction we require is that the regularizer R(·) is chosen as the squared gauge
function γ2K(·) for the decision set K of the learner. Here we will assume1 for every t that ℓt(·) =
1. One can reduce any arbitrary convex loss to the linear loss case by convexity ℓt(x) − ℓ(x
∗) ≤ 〈∂ft(x), x − x
∗〉.
(Shalev-Shwartz et al. (2012); Hazan (2014); Rakhlin and Sridharan (2016)).
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〈lt, ·〉 for some vector lt, hence the objective (1) reduces to
xt = argmin
x∈K
η〈Lt−1, x〉+ γ2K(x), (7)
where Lt−1 = l1 + . . . + lt−1. Denote bndry(K) as the boundary of the constraint set K. We can
reparameterize the above optimization, by observing that any point x ∈ K can be written as ρz
where z ∈ bndry(K), and ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence we have
min
ρ∈[0,1]
min
z∈bndry(K)
η〈Lt−1, ρz〉+ γ2K(ρz) = min
ρ∈[0,1]
(
min
z∈bndry(K)
η〈Lt−1, z〉
)
ρ+ ρ2. (8)
We are able to remove the dependence on the gauge function since it is homogeneous, γK(ρx) =
|ρ|γK(x), and is identically 1 on the boundary of K. The inner minimization reduces to the linear
optimization z∗ := argminz∈K〈Lt−1, z〉, and the optimal ρ is max(0,min(1,−(η/2)〈Lt−1 , z∗〉)).
2.3. Solving zero-sum convex-concave games
Let us now apply the tools described above to the problem of solving a particular class of zero-
sum games; these are often referred to as convex-concave saddle point problems. Assume we have
convex and compact sets X ⊂ Rn, Y ⊂ Rm, known as the action spaces for the two players. We
are given a convex-concave payoff function g : X × Y; that is, g(·, y) is convex in its first argument
for every fixed y ∈ Y , and g(x, ·) is concave in its second argument for every fixed x ∈ X . We say
that a pair (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ X × Y is an ǫ-equilibrium for g(·, ·) if supy∈Y g(xˆ, y)− infx∈X g(x, yˆ) ≤ ǫ..
The celebrated minimax theorem, first proven by von Neumann for a simple class of biaffine
payoff functions (v. Neumann, 1928; Neumann et al., 1944) and generalized by Sion (1958) and
others, states that there exist 0-equilibria for convex-concave games under reasonably weak condi-
tions. Another way to state this infx∈X supy∈Y g(x, y) = supy∈Y infx∈X g(x, y), and we tend to
call this quantity V ∗, the value of the game g(·, ·).
The method of computing an ǫ-equilibrium using a pair of no-regret algorithms is reasonably
straightforward, although here we will emphasize the use of weighted regret, which has been much
less common in the literature. Algorithm 1 describes a basic template used throughout the paper.
Algorithm 1 Computing equilibria using no-regret algorithms
1: Input: a T -length sequence α
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: x-player selects xt ∈ X using no-regret algorithm OAlgx
4: y-player selects yt ∈ Y using (possibly-different) no-regret algorithm OAlgy
5: x-player suffers loss ℓt(xt) with weight αt, where ℓt(·) = g(·, yt)
6: y-player suffers loss ht(yt) with weight αt, where ht(·) = −g(xt, ·)
7: end for
8: Output (x¯α, y¯α) :=
(∑T
s=1 αsxs
AT
,
∑T
s=1 αsys
AT
)
Theorem 9 Assume that a convex-concave game payoff g(·, ·) and a T -length sequence α are
given. Assume that we run Algorithm 1 using no-regret procedures OAlgx and OAlgy , and the α-
weighted average regret of each is α-REG
x
and α-REG
y
, respectively. Then the output (x¯α, y¯α) is
an ǫ-equilibrium for g(·, ·), with ǫ = α-REGx +α-REGy.
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The theorem can be restated in terms of V ∗, where we get the following “ǫ-sandwich”:
V ∗ − ǫ ≤ infx∈X g (x, y¯α) ≤ V ∗ ≤ supy∈Y g (x¯α, y) ≤ V ∗ + ǫ (9)
But the key insight is that the regret analysis leads immediately to a convergence rate for the algo-
rithmic template presented above. We provide the proof of Theorem 9 in Appendix C.
2.4. Application: the Frank-Wolfe Algorithm
We can tie the above set of tools together with an illustrative application, describing a natural con-
nection to the Frank-Wolfe (FW) method (Frank and Wolfe, 1956) for constrained optimization.
The ideas presented here summarize the work of Abernethy and Wang (2017), but in Section 3 we
significantly strengthen the result for a special case.
We have a convex set K, an L-smooth convex function f : K → R, and some initial point
w0 ∈ K. The FW algorithm makes repeated calls to a linear optimization oracle over K, followed
by a convex averaging step:
(linear opt) vt = argminv∈K〈v,∇f(wt−1)〉; (update) wt = (1− ηt)wt−1 + ηtvt,
where the parameter ηt is a learning rate, and following the standard analysis one sets ηt =
2
t+2 . A
well-known result is that f(wT )− infw∈K f(w) ≤ 2LD2/T .
Let us leverage Theorem 9 to obtain a convergence rate from a no-regret perspective. With a
brief inspection, one can verify that FW is indeed a special case of Algorithm 1, assuming that (a) the
game payoff is g(x, y) := f∗(x)− 〈x, y〉, where f∗ is the Fenchel conjugate of f ; (b) the sequence
α is 1, 2, . . . , T ; (c) the x-player and y-player employ FOLLOWTHELEADER and BESTRESPONSE,
respectively; we output the final iterate as wT := y¯α. We refer to Abernethy and Wang (2017) for a
thorough exposition, but it is striking that this use of Algorithm 1 leads to Frank-Wolfe even up to
ηt =
2
t+2 .
As we have reframed FW in terms of our repeated game, we can now appeal to our main theorem
to obtain a rate. We must first observe, using the duality of Fenchel conjugation, that
V ∗ = supy infx g(x, y) = −(infy supx〈x, y〉 − f∗(x)) = −(infy f(y)). (10)
Using (9) and the above equality, we can obtain f(y¯α) ≤ infy∈K f(x) +α-REGx +α-REGy.
The convergence rate of FW thus boils down to bounding the regret of the two players. We note
first that the y-player is prescient and employs BESTRESPONSE, hence we conclude thatα-REG
y ≤
0. The x-player on the other hand will suffer the α-weighted regret of FOLLOWTHELEADER. But
notice, critically, that the choice of payoff g(x, y) = f∗(x)−〈x, y〉 happens to be strongly convex in
x, as L-smoothness of f implies L−1-strong convexity in f∗. We may thus use Lemma 8 to obtain:
α-REG
x Lemma 8≤ 12AT
∑T
t=1
α2tD∑t
τ=1 ατ (1/L)
≤ O(∑Tτ=1 LD2/AT ) = O(LD2T ),
where we use the fact that the x-player observes an αt/L strongly convex function, αtℓt(·), and that
‖vt‖2 in Lemma 8 is ‖αt∇ℓt(·)‖2 ≤ α2tD2, where D is the diameter of Y . We conclude by noting
that the absence of the log T term, which tends to arise from the regret of online strongly convex
optimization, was removed by carefully selecting the sequence of weights α.
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3. Fast convergence in the FW game
In this section, we introduce a new FW-like algorithm that achieves a O(1/T 2) convergence rate on
β-Gauge sets Y accessed using a linear optimization oracle. The design and analysis are based on
a reweighting scheme and OPTIMISTIC-FTRL, taking advantage of recent tools developed for fast
rates in solving games (Chiang et al., 2012; Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013b; Syrgkanis et al., 2015).
In Theorem 10 we give an instantiation of Algorithm 1 that finds an approximate saddle point
for the FW game g(x, y) = f∗(x) − 〈x, y〉. In this instantiation the x-player plays OPTIMISTIC-
FTL and the y-player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER. With an appropriate weighting, the
weighted regret guarantees of these two algorithms imply that we can find an O( 1
T 2
)-approximate
saddle point solution of the FW game in T rounds. Recalling that minx∈X {f∗(x) − 〈x, y〉} =
−f(y), this immediate translates to a convergence rate of O( 1T 2 ) for the the problem miny∈Y f(y).
The algorithm that we describe in Theorem 10 does not immediately yield a FW-like algorithm—
in general, we may not be able to compute the y-player’s BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER iterates
using only a linear optimization oracle. However, if the y-player uses the squared gauge function of
Y as a regularizer, then the y iterates are computable using a linear optimization oracle, as shown
in Section 2.2. This fact immediately implies that for β-Gauge sets and upon choosing the gauge
function as regularizer, Algorithm 2 instantiates a projection-free procedure which provides a con-
vergence rate of O(1/T 2) for the problem miny∈Y f(y) (see Corollary 11). In Appendix G, we dis-
cuss how to get a faster rate than O(1/T ) for arbitrary convex sets if BETHEPERTURBEDLEADER
rather than BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER is used by the y-player in the FW game.
3.1. Solving the FW game with OPTIMISTIC-FTL and BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER
In this section, we present our algorithm for finding O(1/T 2)-saddle point solutions to the FW
game. We instantiate Algorithm 1 using the FW objective g(x, y) = f∗(x) − 〈x, y〉, where we
assume f is L-smooth and σ-strongly convex. The x-player plays OPTIMISTIC-FTL and the y-
player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER.
Theorem 10 Assume that we instantiate Algorithm 1 with the FW game g(x, y) = f∗(x) −
〈x, y〉, weight sequence αt = t, and the following strategies for the players. The x-player plays
OPTIMISTIC-FTL:
xt = argminx∈X
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(x) +mt(x) withmt(x) = αtℓt−1(x) (11)
where ℓt(x) = g(x, yt), and the y-player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER:
yt = argminy∈Y
∑t
s=1 αshs(y) +
1
ηR(y) (12)
with a β-strongly-convex regularizer R(·) and η = β/16L(1 + Lσ ), where ht(x) = −g(xt, y).
Then the output (x¯α, y¯α) of Algorithm 1 is an O
(
L(R(y∗)−R(z))(1+L
σ
)
βT 2
)
-approximate saddle point
solution to the FW game, where z = argminy∈Y R(y).
Now recall that for the FW setting, we are interested in y-players that may only employ a linear
optimization oracle. In general it is impossible to solve Equation (12) within O(1) calls to such
oracles in each round. Nevertheless, recall that for β-Gauge sets, choosing R(y) = γ2Y(y) induces
a β-strongly-convex regularizer, while enabling us to solve Equation (12) with a single call to the
8
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linear oracle, as shown in Equation 8. The proof of Theorem 10 shows that the x-player’s strategy is
the gradient of the primal objective f at the point y¯
α
′
1:t−1
, whereα′ is a weight vector such that α′s =
αs for s = 1, ..., t− 1 and α′t−1 = αt−1 + αt and y¯α′1:t−1 is the α′-weighted average of y1, ..., yt−1
(See Equation 18). This leads to Algorithm 2 and Corollary 11.
Algorithm 2 A new FW algorithm
1: Let α be a T -length weight sequence
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: Define the T -length sequence α′ as α′s = αs for s = 1, . . . , t− 1, and α′t = αt−1 + αt
4: Set xt = ∇f(Σ
t−1
s=1α
′
sys
At
)
5: Set (yˆt, ρt) = argmin
y∈Y ,ρ∈[0,1]
∑t
s=1 ρ〈y, αsxs〉+ 1ηρ2 for η = β16L(1+L
σ
)
6: Set yt = ρtyˆt
7: end for
8: Output y¯T :=
∑T
s=1 αsys
AT
, where AT =
∑T
s=1 αt
We get the following corollary of the above theorem. The full proof is in Appendix F.
Corollary 11 Let f : Y 7→ R be L-smooth and σ-strongly-convex. Also assume that Y is a
β-Gauge set. Let αt = t. Then the output y¯T in Algorithm 2 is an O
(
L(R(y∗)−R(z))(1+L
σ
)
βT 2
)
-
approximate optimal solution to the optimization problem miny∈Y f(y). Moreover, Algorithm 2
only requires a single linear optimization oracle call in each round.
3.2. Proof of Theorem 10
Proof [Proof of Theorem 10] In the FW game, we observe that the loss functions αtℓt(·) seen by
the x-player are αtL -strongly convex, since the function f(·) is L smooth, which implies that f∗(·)
is 1L -strongly convex.
The x-player chooses xt based on OPTIMISTIC-FTL: xt = argminx∈X
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(x) +
mt(x), where mt(x) = αtℓt−1(x). To analyze the regret of the x-player, let us first denote the
update of the standard FOLLOWTHELEADER as
zt = argminx
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(x). (13)
Denote x∗ := argminx∈X
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(x).
2 Now we are going to analyze the α-weighted regret
of the x-player, which is
α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(xt)− αtℓt(x∗)
=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(xt)− αtℓt(zt+1)−mt(xt) +mt(zt+1) +
∑T
t=1mt(xt)−mt(zt+1)
+
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(zt+1)− αtℓt(x∗).
≤∑Tt=1 〈αt∇ℓt(xt)−∇mt(zt+1), xt − zt+1〉+∑Tt=1mt(xt)−mt(zt+1)
+
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(zt+1)− αtℓt(x∗)− 2αtL ‖xt − zt+1‖2,
(14)
2. The following analysis actually holds for any x∗ ∈ X .
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where the last inequality uses strong convexity of ℓt(·) so that
αtℓt(xt)− αtℓt(zt+1) ≤ 〈αt∇ℓt(xt), xt − zt+1〉 − αtL ‖xt − zt+1‖2, (15)
and that
−mt(xt) +mt(zt+1) ≤ 〈∇mt(zt+1), zt+1 − xt〉 − αtL ‖xt − zt+1‖2. (16)
There are three sums in (14). Note that the second sum should be small because the expression
for xt “exploits” mt(·) = αtℓt−1(·) more than the expression for zt−1 does. The third sum is the
regret of BETHELEADER, which is non-positive. In Lemma 14, we show that the second and third
sums in (14) are in total non-positive. For the proof, please see Appendix D.
Sincemt(·) := αtℓt−1(·), each term in the first sum in (14) can be bounded by
〈αt∇ℓt(xt)−∇mt(zt+1), xt − zt+1〉 = αt 〈∇ℓt(xt)−∇ℓt−1(zt+1), xt − zt+1〉
= αt 〈−yt +∇f∗(xt) + yt−1 −∇f∗(zt+1), xt − zt+1〉
≤ αt
(
‖yt − yt−1‖∗‖xt − zt+1‖+ 1
σ
‖xt − zt+1‖2
)
, (17)
where the last inequality uses Ho¨lder’s inequality and the fact that f is σ-strongly convex so
that f∗ is 1σ smooth. Let us analyze ‖xt − zt+1‖2. Note that, by Fenchel conjugacy, zt+1 :=
argminx
∑t
s=1 αs(−y⊤s x+f∗(x)) = ∇f(y¯α1:t), where y¯α1:t is theα-weighted average of y1, . . . , yt
For notational simplicity, let us define a new weight vector α′, where α′s = αs for s = 1, ..., t − 1
and α′t−1 = αt−1 + αt. Similarly, for xt, we have
xt := argmin{αt(−y⊤t−1x+ f∗(x)) +
∑t−1
s=1 αs(−y⊤s x+ f∗(x))} = ∇f(y¯α′1:t−1), (18)
where y¯
α
′
1:t−1
is the α′-weighted average of y1, . . . , yt−1. According to (18),
‖xt − zt+1‖2 = ‖∇f(y¯α1:t)−∇f(y¯α′1:t−1)‖2 ≤ L2‖y¯α1:t − y¯α′1:t−1‖2
=
L2
A2t
‖
t∑
s=1
αsys −
t−1∑
s=1
α′sys‖2 =
L2
A2t
‖αt−1yt−1 + αtyt − α′t−1yt−1‖2
= L
2
A2t
‖αt(yt−1 − yt)‖2 =
(
αtL
At
)2
‖yt−1 − yt‖2. (19)
Combining (17) and (19), we get
(αt∇ℓt(xt)−∇mt(zt+1))⊤(xt − zt+1) ≤ αt(‖yt − yt−1‖∗‖xt − zt+1‖+ 1
σ
‖xt − zt+1‖2)
≤ αt
((
αtL
At
)
‖yt − yt−1‖2 + 1σ
(
αtL
At
)2
‖yt − yt−1‖2
)
.
(20)
Therefore, we have shown that the first sum in (14) is bounded by
∑T
t=1 αt
((
αtL
At
)
‖yt − yt−1‖2 + 1σ
(
αtL
At
)2
‖yt − yt−1‖2
)
. (21)
By (14), (21), and Lemma 14, we get the upper bound of the regret of the x-player,
α-REGx ≤∑Tt=1 αt
((
αtL
At
)
‖yt − yt−1‖2 + 1σ
(
αtL
At
)2
‖yt − yt−1‖2
)
. (22)
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Now let us switch to analyze the regret of the y-player, which is defined as α-REGy :=∑T
t=1−αth(yt) + αtht(y∗) =
∑T
t=1−αt(−〈xt, yt〉 + f∗(xt)) + αt(−〈xt, y∗〉 + f∗(xt)), which
equals
∑T
t=1〈yt − y∗, αtxt〉. This means that the y-player actually observes the linear loss αtxt
in each round t, due to the fact that the y-player plays after the x-player plays. We can reinterpret
BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER as OPTIMISTIC-FTRL (Syrgkanis et al. (2015)) when the learner
is fully informed as to the loss function for the current round. That is, we may write the update as
yt = argminy∈Y〈y,
∑t−1
s=1 αsxs +mt〉+ 1ηR(y), wheremt := αtxt and R(·) is β-strongly convex
with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ on Y .
For loss vectors θt, Theorem 16 gives the regret of OPTIMISTIC-FTRL as
∑T
t=1〈yt − y∗, θt〉 ≤
R(y∗)−R(z)−β
2
(
∑T
t=1 ‖yt−zt‖2+
∑T
t=1 ‖yt−zt+1‖2)
η +
∑T
t=1
η
β‖θt −mt‖2∗, (23)
where zt is FTRL update, defined as zt = argminz∈Y〈z,
∑t−1
s=1 θs〉+ 1ηR(y), while yt is OPTIMISTIC-
FTRL update, defined as yt = argminz∈Y〈z, (
∑t−1
s=1 θs) +mt〉 + 1ηR(y). We prove Theorem 16
in Appendix E.
Since in our case θt = mt = αtxt, yt = zt+1 we get the bound of the regret of the y-player in
the FW game,
α-REGy ≤ R(y
∗)−R(z)−β
2
∑T
t=1 ‖yt−yt−1‖2
η . (24)
Combining (22) and (24), we get
α-REGx +α-REGy ≤∑Tt=1
{
αt
((
αtL
At
)
‖yt − yt−1‖2 + 1σ
(
αtL
At
)2
‖yt − yt−1‖2
)
+
R(y∗)−R(z)−β
2
∑T
t=1 ‖yt+1−yt‖2
η
} (25)
The coefficient of ‖yt− yt−1‖2 is α
2
tL
At
+ αtσ (
αtL
At
)2− β2η and, as αt = t and if we set η = β16L(1+L
σ
)
,
the quantity becomes negative. So,
α-REG
x
+α-REG
y ≤ α-REGx+α-REGyAt = O
(
L(R(y∗)−R(z))(1+L
σ
)
βT 2
)
. (26)
Combining this with Theorem 9 completes the proof.
4. Linear convergence in some strongly-convex and strongly-concave game
The O(1/T 2) rate in the previous section is nice, as it shows that one can achieve “acceleration”
under certain conditions using no-regret learning dynamics. But when can we get even faster rates
using the template Algorithm 1? In the present section we describe scenarios in which the two play-
ers can compute an approximate equilibrium in linear time, i.e. with a rate exponentially decaying
in T . This requires stronger assumptions on the payoff g(·, ·), and we will explore three such sce-
narios. But at a minimum we assume, throughout this section, that g(x, y) is (a) σx-strongly convex
in x, (b) L-smooth in x for every y ∈ Y .
The key to obtaining a fast rate is to consider the function s(x) = supy∈Y g(x, y). This
function reports the payoff/loss value given to x when the y-player plays the best response yx =
11
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argmaxy∈Y g(x, y); i.e. s(x) = g(x, yx). We make two important insights about s. First, the
supremum of strongly convex functions remains strongly convex, so s is σx strongly convex in x.
Second, we make an important insight, established below, that the gradient of g(·, yx) at the point x
must be a subgradient of s(·) also at x. This is formally stated and proven in Appendix I.
The key property needed for s(·) however, is smoothness. It is easy to construct games for which
g(·, ·) is smooth in a very strong sense, but the resulting s(·) is non-smooth. We need additional
structure, and we give three scenarios where the condition holds. s(·) is smooth when any of the
following are true:
1. We can write g(x, y) = a(x)+x⊤My−b(y), where a(x) is any σx-strongly convex function
of x,M is a matrix, and b(y) is any σy-strongly convex function of y; (See Appendix I)
2. The function g(x, y) is σy-strongly-concave in y, the best response function yx := argmaxy∈Y
g(x, y) is always achieved in the interior of Y , and we have that for every w, z ∈ X ,
‖∇yzg(w, ·) −∇yzg(z, ·)‖ ≤ L‖w − z‖; (See Appendix J)
3. Assume we have the Frank-Wolfe game, where g(x, y) := f∗(x)− 〈x, y〉, the objective f(·)
is smooth, and we are guaranteed that ‖∇f(y)‖2 is lower bounded by some positive constant
B for every y ∈ Y .
Any of the above conditions is suitable to obtain our main result of this section, which is that
the framework of no-regret equilibrium computation allows one to obtain a linear convergence rate
to solve certain games. This combines a careful analysis of the game, with a recent online-to-batch
conversion trick given by Levy (2017). The key tool is to set the sequence of weights according to
the inverse squared norm of the loss gradients. The result relies on the x-player using an algorithm
known as SC-AdaGrad, a simple adaptive gradient descent procedure (Algorithm 3). We postpone
the description of this algorithm, and the proof of the following theorem, to Appendix K.
Theorem 12 Assume g satisfies any conditions such that the resulting s(·) is L-smooth and σ-
strongly convex function for constants L and σ and moreover that (argminx∈Rd s(x)) ∈ X . Sup-
pose we instantiate Algorithm 1, where x-player uses SC-AdaGrad (Algorithm 3) for loss func-
tions αtℓt(·) = αtg(·, yt), y-player uses BESTRESPONSE, and the sequence α is defined as αt :=
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2. Let T ≥ Lσ log 3, and constant G upper bounded ‖∇ℓt‖. Then the output (x¯α, y¯α) is
an ǫ-equilibrium of g where ǫ = O
(
G2T
L e
− σ
L
T
)
.
Notice that one of our scenarios stated above is the Frank-Wolfe game with an additional strong
convexity assumption on the objective f , as well as a necessary lower bound on the norm of ∇f
within the feasible region. That we achieve a linear rate for this scenario is indeed not surprising,
as this was previously established (Levitin and Polyak, 1966; Demyanov and Rubinov, 1970; Dunn,
1979). Unfortunately, Theorem 12 does not provide an FW-like algorithm, as the combination of
the SC-AdaGrad and BESTRESPONSE subroutines do not reduce to a simple linear optimization.
An alternative algorithm we propose called SC-AFTL (Algorithm 4), which is akin to an adaptive
version of FOLLOWTHELEADER, does reduce to a linear oracle. We state the main theorem below,
yet its proof and Algorithm 4 are described in full detail in Appendix L.
Theorem 13 Consider the FW game in which g(x, y) = −〈x, y〉 + f∗(x). Suppose that f(·) is
a L-smooth convex function and that Y is a λ-strongly convex set. Also assume that the gradients
of the f in Y are bounded away from 0, i.e., maxy∈Y ‖∇f(y)‖ ≥ B. Then, there exists a FW-like
algorithm that has O(exp(−λBL T )) rate.
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Appendix A. Discussion of Optimistic Algorithms
Here we discuss optimistic algorithms for online learning. Assume that the loss functions are linear
and let ℓt(·) = 〈lt, ·〉. When there exists some pattern in the loss sequence {lt}, the online learning
problem may not be that adversarial. That is, the loss vectors may be predictable. If a “good
guess” of lt is available, then one might hope to have a better bound than O(
√
T ). Let mt be the
algorithm’s guess for lt. If mt is close to lt, then the regret should be significantly better than
O(
√
T ). There have been several papers that obtain O(
√∑T
t=1 ‖lt −mt‖2) regret in recent years
(e.g Chiang et al. (2012); Rakhlin and Sridharan (2013a); Syrgkanis et al. (2015)). Among these,
perhaps OPTIMISTIC-FTRL (Syrgkanis et al. (2015)) has the simplest update rule:
OPTIMISTIC-FTRL xt = argmin
x∈K
〈
mt +
∑t−1
s=1 ls, x
〉
+ 1ηR(x) (27)
Appendix B. Examples of β-Gauge sets
Garber and Hazan (2015) lists three known classes of strongly convex sets. They are all in the form
of norm ball constraints. These are all β-Gauge sets.
1. ℓp balls: ‖x‖p ≤ r,∀p ∈ (1, 2]. The strong convexity of the set is λ = p−1r and its squared
of gauge function is 1
r2
‖x‖2p, which is a 2(p−1)r2 -strongly convex function with respect to norm
‖ · ‖p by Lemma 4 in Garber and Hazan (2015).
2. Schatten p balls: ‖σ(X)‖p ≤ r for p ∈ (1, 2], where σ(X) is the vector consisting of singular
values of the matrix X. The strong convexity of the set is λ = p−1r and the squared gauge
function is 1r2 ‖σ(X)‖2p, which is a
2(p−1)
r2 -strongly convex function with respect to norm
‖σ(·)‖p by Lemma 6 in Garber and Hazan (2015).
3. Group (s,p) balls: ‖X‖s,p = ‖(‖X1‖s, ‖X2‖s, . . . , ‖Xm‖s)‖p ≤ r where X ∈ Rm×n,
Xj represents the j-th row of X, and s, p ∈ (1, 2]. The strong convexity of the set is
λ = 2(s−1)(p−1)r((s−1)+(p−1)) and its squared gauge function is
1
r2
‖X‖2s,p, which is a 2(s−1)(p−1)r2((s−1)+(p−1)) -
strongly convex function with respect to norm ‖ · ‖s,p by Lemma 8 in Garber and Hazan
(2015).
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Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9 Assume that a convex-concave game payoff g(·, ·) and a T -length sequence α are
given. Assume that we run Algorithm 1 using no-regret procedures OAlgx and OAlgy , and the α-
weighted average regret of each is α-REG
x
and α-REG
y
, respectively. Then the output (x¯α, y¯α) is
an ǫ-equilibrium for g(·, ·), with
ǫ = α-REG
x
+α-REG
y
.
Proof The proof basically replicates the one in Abernethy and Wang (2017) except that the loss
functions of both learners are re-weighted here. It will turn out that the re-weighting trick is one of
the keys to getting fast rate for some games.
In each round, the weighted loss function of the x-player is αtℓt(·) : X → R, where ℓt(·) :=
g(·, yt). The y-player, on the other hand, observes her own sequence of loss functions αtht(·) :
Y → R, where ht(·) := −g(xt, ·).
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, yt) =
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
−αtht(yt)
= − 1∑T
s=1 αs
inf
y∈Y
{
T∑
t=1
αtht(y)
}
− Regret
y
T∑T
s=1 αs
= sup
y∈Y
{
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, y)
}
−α-REGy
(Jensen) ≥ sup
y∈Y
g
(
1∑T
s=1 αs
∑T
t=1 αtxt, y
)
−α-REGy (28)
≥ inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
g (x, y)−α-REGy
Let us now apply the same argument on the right hand side, where we use the x-player’s regret
guarantee.
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, yt) =
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtℓt(xt)
= inf
x∈X
{
T∑
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtℓt(x)
}
+
RegretxT∑T
s=1 αs
= inf
x∈X
{
T∑
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtg(x, yt)
}
+α-REG
x
≤ inf
x∈X
g
(
x,
∑T
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtyt
)
+α-REG
x
(29)
≤ sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
g(x, y) +α-REG
x
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Note that the game value V ∗ = infx∈X supy∈Y g(x, y) = supy∈Y infx∈X g(x, y). Combining (28)
and (29), we see that:
sup
y∈Y
g (x¯α, y)−α-REGy ≤ inf
x∈X
g (x, y¯α) +α-REG
x
which implies that (x¯α, y¯α) is an α-REG
x
+ α-REG
y
approximate solution to the saddle point
problem.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 14 from Proof of Theorem 10
We prove the following stronger statement.
Lemma 14 Let xt be the OPTIMISTIC-FTL update xt = argminx∈X
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(x) + mt(x),
where mt(x) = αtℓt−1(x). Let zt be the standard FOLLOWTHELEADER update given by zt =
argminx
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(x). Let αt = t. Let ℓt be (1/L)-strongly convex for all t.
T∑
t=1
mt(xt)−mt(zt+1) +
T∑
t=1
αtℓt(zt+1)− αtℓt(w) ≤ DT (30)
for any w ∈ X , where
DT = −
T∑
t=1
(
At−1
2L
‖zt − xt‖2 + At
2L
‖zt+1 − xt‖2
)
.
We use the following standard lemma for strongly convex functions.
Lemma 15 For a σ-strongly convex function F (·), suppose p∗ is the minimizer. We have
F (p∗) ≤ F (q) + 〈∇F (p∗), p∗ − q〉 − σ
2
‖p∗ − q‖2,
which leads to
F (p∗) ≤ F (q)− σ
2
‖p∗ − q‖2.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 14]
We use mathematical induction for the proof. The proof in the following uses Lemma 15, which
is a property of strongly convex functions. For the base case T = 0, it holds because 0 ≤ 0.
Assume it holds for T = τ − 1, that is
τ−1∑
t=1
mt(xt)−mt(zt+1) +
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(zt+1)− αtℓt(w) ≤ Dτ−1 (31)
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Then,
τ∑
t=1
mt(xt)−mt(zt+1) +
τ∑
t=1
αtℓt(zt+1)
(a)
≤ Dτ−1 +mτ (xτ )−mτ (zτ+1) + ατ ℓτ (zτ+1) +
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(zτ )
(b)
≤ Dτ−1 − στ−1
2
‖zτ − xτ‖2 +mτ (xτ )−mτ (zτ+1) + ατ ℓτ (zτ+1) +
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(xτ )
= Dτ−1 − στ−1
2
‖zτ − xτ‖2 −mτ (zτ+1) + ατ ℓτ (zτ+1) + (
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(xτ ) +mτ (xτ ))
(c)
≤ Dτ−1 − στ−1
2
‖zτ − xτ‖2 −
σ′τ−1
2
‖zτ+1 − xτ‖2 −mτ (zτ+1) + ατ ℓτ (zτ+1)
+ (
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(zτ+1) +mτ (zτ+1))
= Dτ−1 − στ−1
2
‖zτ − xτ‖2 −
σ′τ−1
2
‖zτ+1 − xτ‖2 +
τ∑
t=1
αtℓt(zτ+1)
≤ Dτ +
τ∑
t=1
αtℓt(w)
(32)
where (a) is by the assumption that it holds at τ − 1 and by setting w = zτ , (b) is by using the
strong convexity lemma (Lemma 15) to get the following,
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(zτ ) ≤
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(xτ )− στ−1
2
‖zτ − xτ‖2, (33)
as zτ is the minimizer of the στ−1-strongly convex function
∑τ−1
t=1 αtℓt(·) for στ−1 :=
∑τ−1
s=1
αs
L =
Aτ−1
L , (c) is by using Lemma 15 again to get
τ−1∑
t=1
αtℓt(xτ ) +mτ (xτ ) ≤
τ−1∑
s=1
αtℓt(zτ+1) +mτ (zτ+1)−
σ′τ−1
2
‖zτ+1 − xτ‖2, (34)
as xτ is the minimizer of the σ
′
τ−1-strongly convex function
∑τ−1
t=1 αtℓt(·) + mτ (·) for σ′τ−1 :=∑τ−1
s=1
αs
L +
ατ
L =
Aτ
L , and the last inequality is by the fact that zτ+1 is the minimizer of
∑τ
t=1 αtℓt(·).
Appendix E. Optimistic FTRL
In this subsection, we analyze the regret bound for OPTIMISTIC-FTRL. Let θt be the loss function
in round t and let the cumulative loss vector be Lt =
∑t
s=1 θs. The update of OPTIMISTIC-FTRL
18
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is
yt = argmin
y∈Y
〈y, Lt−1 +mt〉+ 1
η
R(y), (35)
wheremt is the learner’s guess of the loss vector θt, R(·) is a β-strong convex function with respect
to a norm (‖ · ‖) on the constraint set Y and η is a parameter. The analysis of Syrgkanis et al. (2015)
is based on the assumption that Y is a simplex. Here, we want to extend their results for Y being
an arbitrary convex set. Define the regret to be Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈yt − y∗, θt〉. The proof basically
replicates the one of (Luo (2017)) except that we consider any convex set and any strongly convex
regularization term instead of negative entropy as in his note.
Theorem 16 OPTIMISTIC-FTRL (35) has regret
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈yt − y∗, θt〉 ≤
R(y∗)−R(z)−β
2
(
∑T
t=1 ‖yt−zt‖2+
∑T
t=1 ‖yt−zt+1‖2)
η
+
∑T
t=1
η
β‖θt −mt‖2∗,
(36)
where zt = argminy∈Y〈y, Lt−1〉 + 1ηR(y) is the update of the standard FOLLOWTHEREGULAR-
IZEDLEADER, and z = argminy∈Y R(y).
Proof We can re-write the regret as
Regret :=
T∑
t=1
〈yt − y∗, θt〉 =
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1, θt −mt〉+
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1 − y∗, θt〉
(37)
Let us analyze the first sum
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1, θt −mt〉. (38)
Now using Lemma 17 with y1 = yt, u1 =
∑t−1
s=1 θs + mt and y2 = zt+1, u2 =
∑t
s=1 θs in the
lemma, we have
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1, θt −mt〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
‖yt − zt+1‖‖θt −mt‖∗ ≤
T∑
t=1
η
β
‖θt −mt‖2∗. (39)
For the other sum,
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1 − y∗, θt〉, (40)
we are going to show that it is upper-bounded by
R(y∗)−R(z)−DT
η
, (41)
for any y∗ ∈ Y , where DT =
∑T
t=1
β
2 ‖yt − zt‖2 + β2 ‖yt − zt+1‖2.
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Using induction, we see that the base case T = 0 clearly is true. Assume that it also holds for
T − 1, for a T ≥ 1. Then, we have
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1, θt〉
≤ 〈yT − zT+1,mT 〉+ 〈zT+1, θT 〉+ R(zT )−R(z)−DT−1
η
+ 〈zT , LT−1〉
(a)
≤ 〈yT − zT+1,mT 〉+ 〈zT+1, θT 〉+
R(yT )−R(z)−DT−1 − β2 ‖yT − zT ‖2
η
+ 〈yT , LT−1〉
= 〈zT+1, θT −mT 〉+
R(yT )−R(z)−DT−1 − β2 ‖yT − zT ‖2
η
+ 〈yT , LT−1 +mT 〉
(b)
≤ 〈zT+1, θT −mT 〉+
R(zT+1)−R(z)−DT−1 − β2 ‖yT − zT ‖2 − β2 ‖yT − zT+1‖2
η
+ 〈zT+1, LT−1 +mT 〉
= 〈zT+1, LT 〉+ R(zT+1)−R(z)−DT
η
(c)
≤ 〈y∗, LT 〉+ R(y
∗)−R(z)−DT
η
,
(42)
where (a) and (b) are by strong convexity so that
〈zT , LT−1〉+ R(zT )
η
≤ 〈yT , LT−1〉+ R(yT )
η
− β
2η
‖yT − zT ‖2, (43)
and
〈yT , LT−1 +mT 〉+ R(yT )
η
≤ 〈zT+1, LT−1 +mT 〉+ R(zT+1)
η
− β
2η
‖yT − zT+1‖2. (44)
(c) is because zT+1 is the optimal point of argminy〈y, LT 〉+ R(y)η .
Now we have shown that
T∑
t=1
〈yt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1 − y∗, θt〉 ≤ R(y
∗)−R(z)−DT
η
, (45)
for any y∗ ∈ Y .
Combining (39) and (45) completes the theorem (36).
Lemma 17 Denote y1 = argminy〈y, u1〉 + 1ηR(y) and y2 = argminy〈y, u2〉 + 1ηR(y) for a
β-strongly convex function R(·) with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖. We have ‖y1 − y2‖ ≤ ηβ‖u1 − u2‖∗.
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Proof From strong convexity, we have
〈y1, u1〉+ 1
η
R(y1) ≤ 〈y2, u1〉+ 1
η
R(y2)− β
2η
‖y1 − y2‖2,
and
〈y2, u2〉+ 1
η
R(y2) ≤ 〈y1, u2〉+ 1
η
R(y1)− β
2η
‖y1 − y2‖2.
Adding the above inequalities together, we get
〈y2 − y1, u2 − u1〉 ≤ −β
η
‖y1 − y2‖2,
or
〈y1 − y2, u2 − u1〉 ≥ β
η
‖y1 − y2‖2.
So, by using Ho¨lder’s inequality,
η
β
‖u1 − u2‖∗ ≥ ‖y1 − y2‖.
Appendix F. Proof of Corollary 11
Proof [Proof of Corollary 11] Let ǫ = O
(
L(1+L
σ
)
βT 2
)
. We can see from (8) that the y iterates are
exactly the actions of the y-player in Theorem 10 when R(y) = γ2Y(y). Likewise, the x-player’s
iterates are exactly those of the x-player in Theorem 10, as shown in Equation 18. As the weight
vector α is the same as in Theorem 10, we know that (x¯α, y¯α) is an ǫ-approximate saddle point to
the FW game g(x, y) = f∗(x)− 〈x, y¯α〉. Then we have:
f(y¯α) = sup
x∈X
〈x, y¯α〉 − f∗(x) = − inf
x∈X
g(x, y¯α) ≤ −V ∗ + ǫ
where V ∗ is the value of the FW game, which we showed in (10) is equal to − infy∈Y f(y).
Also note that Algorithm 2 does not need to store all the points {yt}, as it can instead maintain
a variable recording the weighted sum of the points.
Appendix G. The y-player plays BETHEPERTURBEDLEADER in the FW game
Suppose now the y-player plays in round t plays BETHEPERTURBEDLEADER,
yt = Eξ∼Bu(·)[argmin
y∈Y
〈y,
t∑
s=1
xs + ξ〉], (46)
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where Bu(·) is a uniform sample on the ℓ2 ball of radius u. We are going to analyze the distance
term ‖yt − yt−1‖2 in the regret of the x-player (22). Define Ψ(x) = Eξ∼Bu(·)[maxy∈Y〈y, x〉]. If
the max expression inside the expectation has a unique maximizer we can swap the expectation
and gradient (Proposition 2.2 in (Bertsekas (1973))). So, the gradient can be written as ∇Ψ(x) =
Eξ∼Bu(·)[arg maxy∈Y〈y, x〉]. Now we see that the update of Be-the-Perturbed-Leader (46) can be
connected to the gradient of Ψ(·). That is,
yt = ∇Ψ(−
t∑
s=1
xs) = Eξ∼Bu(·)[argmax
y∈Y
〈y,−
t∑
s=1
xs + ξ〉]. (47)
Using Lemma E.2 in (Duchi et al. (2012)), we know that Φ is a L0
√
d
u smooth function, where L0 is
the bound of the norm ‖∇Ψ(·)‖ and d is the dimension of Y .
Consequently.
‖yt − yt−1‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∇Ψ
(
−
t∑
s=1
xs
)
−∇Ψ
(
−
t−1∑
s=1
xs
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ L
2
0d
u2
∥∥∥∥∥−
t∑
s=1
xs +
t−1∑
s=1
xs
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ LL
2
0d
u2
,
(48)
where the last inequality is by the fact that xt is a gradient vector and that the norm of gradient is
bounded by the smooth constant L by the assumption. One can also show that regret of Be-the-
perturbed-leader is bounded by O(u) (e.g. Kalai and Vempala (2005a); Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
(2006)).
Combining α-REGx of (22) and α-REGy ,
α-REGx
AT
+
α-REGy
AT
≤
∑T
t=1 αt((
αtL
At
)‖yt − yt−1‖2 + 1σ (αtLAt )2‖yt − yt−1‖2) +O(u)∑T
t=1 αt
≤ O
(
(
∑T
t=1
L2L20d
σu2 ) + u
T 2
)
,
(49)
where the last inequality is due to that αt = t and so that AT = O(T
2). Setting u = O(T 1/3) leads
to α-REG
x
AT
+ α-REG
y
AT
= O(
L2L2
0
d
σT 5/3
). The rate is better than O(1/T ) when the dimension d is small.
Note that we do not make any assumption on the constraint set Y , so the rate holds for any convex
set Y . Yet, to get the fast rate, one needs to have a efficient way to compute (46), which seems to
involve large number of calls to the linear oracle in each iteration. We leave it as an open problem.
Appendix H. The y-player plays BESTRESPONSE in the FW game
If the constraint set is strongly convex, ‖yt − yt−1‖2 is indeed shrinking even if the y-player just
plays BestResponse, assuming the gradient is lower bounded by a constant B. To see this, let
us use Lemma 18 below,
‖yt − yt−1‖ ≤ 2‖xt − xt−1‖
λ(‖xt‖+ ‖xt−1‖) =
2‖∇f(y¯t−1)−∇f(y¯t−2)‖
λ(‖∇f(y¯t−1)‖+ ‖∇f(y¯t−2)‖)
≤ 2L‖y¯t−1 − y¯t−2‖
λ(‖∇f(y¯t−1)‖+ ‖∇f(y¯t−2)‖) = O(
L
λtB
),
(50)
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where the first inequality is due to the lemma and the last equality is by assuming ‖∇f(·)‖ ≥ B.
Since the y-player plays BESTRESPONSE, its regret is 0. Combining this with α-REGx of (22)
and using (50) we have
α-REGx
AT
+
α-REGy
AT
≤
∑T
t=1 αt((
αtL
At
)‖yt − yt−1‖2 + 1σ (αtLAt )2‖yt − yt−1‖2)∑T
t=1 αt
= O(
L log T
λBT 2
).
(51)
Lemma 18 3
Denote xp = argmaxx∈K〈p, x〉 and xq = argmaxx∈K〈q, x〉, where p, q ∈ Rd are any nonzero
vectors. If a compact set K is a λ-strongly convex set, then
‖xp − xq‖ ≤ 2 ‖p− q‖
λ(‖p‖+ ‖q‖) . (52)
Proof Recall that a strongly convex set K can be written as intersection of some Euclidean balls
(c.f. definition 3 in Section 1.1). Namely,
K = ∩
u∈S
B 1
λ
(
xu − u
λ
)
.
Let xp = argmaxx∈K〈 p‖p‖ , x〉 and xq = argmaxx∈K〈 q‖q‖ , x〉. Based on the definition of strongly
convex sets, we can see that xq ∈ B 1
λ
(xp − pλ‖p‖) and xp ∈ B 1λ (xq −
q
λ‖q‖). Therefore,
‖xq − xp − p
λ ‖p‖‖
2 ≤ 1
λ2
,
which leads to
‖p‖ · ‖xp − xq‖2 ≤ 2
λ
〈xp − xq, p〉. (53)
Similarly,
‖xp − xq − q
λ‖q‖‖
2 ≤ 1
λ2
,
which results in
‖q‖ · ‖xp − xq‖2 ≤ 2
λ
〈xq − xp, q〉. (54)
Summing (53) and (54), one gets (‖p‖ + ‖q‖)‖xp − xq‖2 ≤ 2λ〈xp − xq, p − q〉. Applying the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality completes the proof.
3. Polovinkin (1996) has discussed the smoothness of the support function on strongly convex sets. Here, we state the
more general result and give a new proof.
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Appendix I.
Proposition 19 For arbitrary x, let ℓ(·) := g(·, yx). Then∇xℓ(·) ∈ ∂xs(·).
Proof Consider any point w ∈ X ,
s(w)− s(x) = g(w, yw)− g(x, yx)
= g(w, yw)− g(w, yx) + g(w, yx)− g(x, yx) ≥ 0 + g(w, yx)− g(x, yx)
≥ 〈∂xg(·, yx), w − x〉 = 〈∇xℓ(·), w − x〉
(55)
where the first inequality is because that yw is the best response to w, the second inequality is due
to the convexity. The overall statement implies that ∇xℓt(·) is a subgradient of s at x.
We assume that
g(x, y) = a(x) + x⊤My − b(y), (56)
where a(x) is any σx-strongly convex function of x, M is a matrix, and b(y) is any σy-strongly
convex function of y 4.
Proposition 20 Assume the payoff function is in the form of (56) and that the norm is ℓ2 norm (i.e.
‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖2). Given any points w, z ∈ X , the gradient of s(·) satisfies ‖∇ws(w) − ∇zs(z)‖ ≤
(‖M‖
2
σy
+ L)‖w − z‖. This shows that s(·) is a (‖M‖2σy + L)-smooth function.
Proof
‖∇ws(·)−∇zs(·)‖ (a)= ‖∇wg(·, yw)−∇zg(·, yz)‖
(b)
≤ ‖∇wg(·, yw)−∇wg(·, yz)‖+ ‖∇wg(·, yz)−∇zg(·, yz)‖
(c)
≤ ‖∇wg(·, yw)−∇wg(·, yz)‖+ L‖w − z‖
= ‖M(yw − yz)‖+ L‖w − z‖ ≤ ‖M‖ · ‖yw − yz‖+ L‖w − z‖
(57)
where (a) is because of the gradient coincidence (Proposition 19), (b) is due to triangle inequality,
and (c) is the result of the L-smoothness of g(·, ·), and the last inequality is a standard matrix
inequality.
Now we are going to bound ‖yw − yz‖. Recall that the y-player plays BESTRESPONSE, so
yw = argminy∈Y −〈My,w〉 + b(y) and yz = argminy∈Y −〈My, z〉 + b(y). Since b(·) is a σy-
strongly convex function with respect to ‖·‖2, its conjugate b∗(·) is 1σy -strongly smooth with respect
to ‖ · ‖2.
In the following, denote function ψw(y) = −〈My,w〉+ b(y) so that yw = argminy ψw(y) and
yz = argminy ψw(y) + 〈M⊤(w − z), y〉 := argminy ψz(y). By definition of Fenchel-conjugate
(c.f. Rockafellar (1996); Borwein and Lewis (2006)),
ψ∗w(0) = maxy 〈0, y〉 − ψw(y) = −miny ψw(y) = −ψw(yw), (58)
4. We note that some machine learning applications can be written into this form (see, e.g Xu et al. (2005);
Zhang and Xiao (2015)).
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and
∇ψ∗w(0) = yw. (59)
Similarly,
ψ∗w(M
⊤(z−w)) = max
y
〈M⊤(z−w), y〉−ψw(y) = −min
y
(〈M⊤(w−z), y〉+ψw(y) = −ψz(yz),
(60)
and
∇ψ∗w(M⊤(z − w)) = yz. (61)
Therefore,
‖yw − yz‖ = ‖∇ψ∗(0)−∇ψ∗(M⊤(z − w))‖ ≤ 1
σb
‖0−M⊤(z − w)‖ = ‖M‖
σb
‖w − z‖. (62)
Combining the above results, we have
‖∇ws(·)−∇zs(·)‖ ≤ ‖M‖‖yw − yz‖+ L‖w − z‖ ≤
(‖M‖
σb
+ L
)
‖w − z‖. (63)
Appendix J.
Proposition 21 Assume that for all x ∈ X , argminy∈Y g(x, y) ∈ Y . Also assume that the function
g(x, y) is σy-strongly concave in y and that the following smoothness condition holds for any given
points w, z ∈ X , ‖∇yzg(w, ·) − ∇yzg(z, ·)‖ ≤ L‖w − z‖. Then, s(·) is a L(1 + 2Lσy )-smooth
function.
Proof Following the same proof in (57), we have
‖∇ws(·)−∇zs(·)‖ ≤ L‖yw − yz‖+ L‖w − z‖. (64)
Now we need to bound ‖yw − yz‖. Note that −g(x, ·) is a σy-strongly convex function. There-
fore, we have
(−g(w, yz))− (−g(w, yw)) ≥ 〈−∇ywg(w, ·), yz − yw〉+
σy
2
‖yw − yz‖2 ≥ σy
2
‖yw − yz‖2. (65)
This means that
g(w, yw)− g(w, yz) ≥ σy
2
‖yw − yz‖2.
From this, we can also conclude that 5
‖∇yzg(w, ·)‖2 ≥
σy
2
(g(w, yw)− g(w, yz)). (66)
5.
√
2
σy
(g(w, yw)− g(w, yz)‖∇yzg(w, ·)‖ ≥ ‖yw − yz‖∗‖∇yzg(w, ·)‖ ≥ 〈yz − yw,−∇yzg(w, ·)〉 ≥
(−g(w,yz))− (−g(w, yw)).
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Since y is unconstrained, ∇yzg(z, ·) = 0, from the assumption that ‖∇yzg(w, ·)−∇yzg(z, ·)‖ ≤
L‖w − z‖, we have
‖∇yzg(w, ·)‖ ≤ L‖w − z‖. (67)
Putting it all together, we get:
σy
2
‖yw − yz‖2
(65)
≤ g(w, yw)− g(w, yz)
(66)
≤ 2
σy
‖∇yzg(w, ·)‖2
(67)
≤ 2L
2
σy
‖w − z‖2 (68)
So, ‖yw − yz‖ ≤ 2Lσy ‖w − z‖. Substituting it back to (64) completes the proof.
Appendix K. Proof of Theorem 12
Theorem 12 Assume g satisfies any conditions such that the resulting s(·) is L-smooth and σ-
strongly convex function for constants L and σ and moreover that (argminx∈Rd s(x)) ∈ X . Sup-
pose we instantiate Algorithm 1, where x-player uses SC-AdaGrad (Algorithm 3) for loss func-
tions αtℓt(·) = αtg(·, yt), y-player uses BESTRESPONSE, and the sequence α is defined as αt :=
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2. Let T ≥ Lσ log 3, and let G be a constant such that ‖∇ℓt‖ ≤ G for all t. Then the
output (x¯α, y¯α) is an ǫ-equilibrium of g where ǫ = O
(
G2T
L e
− σ
L
T
)
.
The proof of Theorem 12 is a slight modification of the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Levy (2017),
combined with Proposition 19. As before, we let yx = argmaxy∈Y g(x, y). Recall that ℓt(·) =
g(·, yxt) and note ℓt(xt) = g(xt, yxt) = s(xt). Before proving the theorem, let us introduce some
lemmas.
Lemma 22 For any L-smooth convex function ℓ(·) : Rd 7→ R, if x∗ = argminx∈Rd ℓ(x), then
‖∇ℓ(x)‖2 ≤ 2L (ℓ(x)− ℓ(x∗)) , ∀x ∈ Rd .
Lemma 23 (Levy (2017)) For any non-negative real numbers a1, . . . , an ≥ 1,
n∑
i=1
ai∑i
j=1 aj
≤ 1 + log
(
n∑
i=1
ai
)
.
Lemma 24 (Hazan et al. (2007); Levy (2017)) Assume the loss function ℓt(·) : K 7→ R is θt-
strongly convex. Setting ηt =
(∑t
s=1 θs
)−1
in Algorithm 3, we get the following regret for any
x ∈ K:
T∑
t=1
ℓt(xt)−
T∑
t=1
ℓt(x) ≤ 1
2
T∑
t=1
ηt‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2 (69)
where xt+1 = xt − ηt∇ℓt(xt).
Lemma 25 Under the conditions in Theorem 12, G2
∑T
t=1 ‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2 ≥ 13e
σ
L
T
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Algorithm 3 Strongly-Convex Adaptive Gradient Descent (SC-AdaGrad) (Levy (2017))
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2: Play xt ∈ K
3: Receive a θt-strongly convex loss function ℓt(·)
4: Set ηt =
1∑T
t=1 θt
5: Update xt+1 = ΠX (xt − ηt∇ℓt(xt))
6: end for
Proof
T =
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
Proposition 19
=
T∑
t=1
‖∇s(xt)‖2
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
Lemma 22≤
T∑
t=1
2L
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
(s(xt)− s(x∗))
(70)
≤
T∑
t=1
2L
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
(ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x∗)), (71)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that s(xt) = ℓt(xt) and ℓt(x) = g(x, yt) ≤
g(x, yx) = s(x) for any x.
Now we define the following function, which is σ‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2 -strongly convex.
ℓ˜t(x) =
1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2∇ℓt(xt)
Tx+
σ
2 ‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
‖x− xt‖2 (72)
Then we have
T ≤
T∑
t=1
2L
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
(ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x∗))
(a)
≤
T∑
t=1
2L
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
(∇ℓt(xt)T (xt − x∗)− σ
2
‖xt − x∗‖2)
= 2L
T∑
t=1
(
ℓ˜t(xt)− ℓ˜t(x∗)
)
(b)
≤ L
σ
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2∑t
τ=1 ‖∇ℓτ (xτ )‖−2
(c)
≤ L
σ
(
1 + log
(
G2
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2
))
(73)
where (a) is from strong convexity, (b) is by applying Lemma 24 to the function ℓ˜t(·), and (c) is due
to Lemma 23. Thus, we get
G2
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2 ≥ 1
3
e
σ
L
T (74)
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Proof [Proof of Theorem 12]
We consider the weighed loss setting in Algorithm 1: in each round, the loss function of the
x player is αtℓt(·) : X → R, where ℓt(·) := g(·, yt). The y-learner, on the other hand, observes
her own sequence of loss functions αtht(·) : Y → R, where ht(·) := −g(xt, ·). To continue, let
us “re-define” the regret of the x-player in the weighted loss game: α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1(αtℓt(xt)−
αtℓt(x
∗)), where x∗ = argminx∈X s(x).
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, yt) =
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtℓt(xt)
=
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtℓt(x
∗) +
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αt(ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x∗))
=
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtℓt(x
∗) +
α-REGx∑T
s=1 αs
≤
T∑
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtg(x
∗, yt) + ǫT
(a)
≤ g
(
x∗,
∑T
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtyt
)
+ ǫT (75)
≤ max
y∈Y
g(x∗, y) + ǫT (76)
(b)
= s(x∗) + ǫT (77)
= min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
g(x, y) + ǫT ,
where (a) is by Jensen, (b) is by the definition of the function s(x). Then, by combining the above
result with (28), one get the following result
Proposition 26 Denote AT =
∑T
s=1 αs, ǫT the upper bound of
α-REGx
AT
, and δT the upper bound of
α-REGy
AT
. Then, x¯T :=
∑T
s=1 αsxs
AT
satisfies
max
y∈Y
g(x¯T , y) ≤ V ∗ + ǫT + δT .
However, since the y-player plays best response, α-REGy = 0, we only need to consider α-REG
x
AT
.
Here, we consider the weight to be αt = ‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2.
α-REGx
AT
:=
∑T
t=1 αt(ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x∗))
AT
(a)
≤ 1
2σAT
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2∑t
τ=1 ‖∇ℓt(xτ )‖−2
(b)
≤
G2
(
1 + log
(
G2
∑T
t=1 ‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2
))
2σG2
∑T
t=1 ‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2
(c)
≤ 3G
2
(
1 +
(
σT
L
))
2σe
σ
L
T
= O
(
G2T
L
e−
σ
L
T
) (78)
where (a) has be shown in (73), (b) is by Lemma 23, (c) is by (74) and the fact that 1+log zz is
monotonically decreasing for z ≥ 1.
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Next, we relate the weighted regret to the game
α-REGx
AT
:=
∑T
t=1 αt(ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x∗))
AT
=
∑T
t=1 αt(s(xt)− g(x∗, yt))
AT
(a)
≥ h(x¯T )− g(x∗, y¯T ) = g(x¯T , yx¯T )− g(x∗, y¯T ),
(79)
where in (a) we use Jensen for both sums. Thus, our final result is the following,
g(x¯T , yx¯T )− g(x∗, y¯T ) ≤ O
(
G2T
L
e−
σ
L
T
)
, (80)
which also implies
g(x¯T , yx¯T )−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
g(x, y) = g(x¯T , yx¯T )− g(x∗, yx∗)
(a)
≤ g(x¯T , yx¯T )− g(x∗, y¯T )
(80)
≤ O
(
G2T
L
e−
σ
L
T
)
,
(81)
where (a) is because of g(x∗, y¯T ) ≥ g(x∗, yx∗) by definition of best response.
But, we also note that g(x¯T , yx¯T ) = s(x¯T ) ≥ minx∈X s(x) = minx∈X maxy∈Y g(x, y). This
shows that g(x¯T , yx¯T ) is an O(exp(−T )) approximate saddle point solution, so we have completed
the proof.
Appendix L. Proof of Theorem 13
Theorem 13 Consider the FW game in which g(x, y) = −x⊤y + f∗(x). Suppose that f(·) is a
L-smooth convex function and that Y is a λ-strongly convex set. Also assume that the gradients of
the f in Y are bounded away from 0, i.e., maxy∈Y ‖∇f(y)‖ ≥ B. Let T ≥ LλB log 3. Then, there
exists a FW-like algorithm that has O(exp(−λBL T )) rate.
In this section, we give a proof of Theorem 13. Let us first restate the theorem with the explicit
algorithm. Note that in the algorithm that we describe below the weights αt are not predefined
but rather depend on the queries of the algorithm. These adaptive weights are explicitly defined in
Algorithm 4 which is used by the x-player. The y-player plays best response.
Algorithm 4 Strongly-Convex Adaptive Follow-the-Leader (SC-AFTL)
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2: Play xt ∈ K
3: Receive a strongly convex loss function αtℓt(·) with αt = 1‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2 .
4: Update xt+1 = minx∈X
∑t
s=1 αxℓs(x)
5: end for
Before proving the theorem, let us focus on the strategy of the x-player which we describe
in Algorithm 4. This algorithm is equivalent to performing FTL updates over the following loss
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sequence: {
ℓ˜t(x) = αtℓt(x)
}T
t=1
And in the case of FW game, the L-smoothness of f implies that each ℓ˜t(x) is
1/L
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2 -strongly-
convex. Thus Lemma 8 implies the following holds for any x ∈ X :
T∑
t=1
ℓ˜t(xt)−
T∑
t=1
ℓ˜t(x) ≤ L
2
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2∑t
s=1 ‖∇ℓs(xs)‖−2
. (82)
Proof [Proof of Theorem 13] Since the y-player plays best response, α-REGy = 0, we only need
to show that α-REGx ≤ O(exp(−λBL T )), which we do next.
We start by showing that s(x) = maxy∈Y −x⊤y + f∗(x) is a smooth function. We have that
‖∇ws(·)−∇zs(·)‖ = ‖ argmax
y∈Y
(−w⊤y + f∗(w)) − argmax
y∈Y
(−z⊤y + f∗(z))‖
= ‖ argmax
y∈Y
(−w⊤y)− (argmax
y′∈Y
−z⊤y′)‖ ≤ 2‖w − z‖
λ(‖w‖ + ‖z‖) ≤
‖w − z‖
λB
,
(83)
where the second to last inequality uses Lemma 18 regarding λ-strongly convex sets, and the last
inequality is by assuming the gradient of ‖∇f(·)‖ ≥ B and the fact that w, z ∈ X are gradients of
f . This shows that s(·) is a smooth function with smoothness constant L′ = 1λB .
T =
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
Proposition 19
=
T∑
t=1
‖∇s(xt)‖2
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
Lemma 22≤
T∑
t=1
L′
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
(s(xt)− s(x∗))
(84)
≤
T∑
t=1
L′
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖2
(ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x∗)), (85)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that s(xt) = ℓt(xt) and ℓt(x) = g(x, yt) ≤
g(x, yx) = s(x) for any x. We can apply Lemma 22 because argminx∈Rd{maxy∈Y −x⊤y +
f∗(x)} ∈ X , as X is the gradient space.
To continue, we have
T ≤
T∑
t=1
L′
‖ℓt(xt)‖2 (ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x
∗))
(a)
=
T∑
t=1
L′(ℓ˜t(xt)− ℓ˜t(x∗))
(b)
≤ L · L
′
2
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2∑t
s=1 ‖∇ℓs(xt)‖−2
(c)
≤ L · L
′
2
(
1 + log(G2
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2)
)
,
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where (a) is by the definition of ℓ˜t(·), and (b) is shown using (82) with strong convexity parameter
of ℓt(·) being 1L , and (c) is by Lemma 23,
T∑
t=1
‖ℓt(xt)‖−2∑t
s=1 ‖ℓs(xs)‖−2
=
T∑
t=1
G2‖ℓt(xt)‖−2∑t
s=1G
2‖ℓs(xs)‖−2
≤ 1 + log(G2
T∑
t=1
‖ℓt(xt)‖−2).
Thus, we get
G2
T∑
t=1
‖∇ℓt(xt)‖−2 = O(e
1
L·L′
T ) = O(e
λB
L
T ). (86)
The rest of the proof is the same as in (79). So, we can get that g(x¯T , yx¯T ) is an O(exp(−λBL T ))
approximate saddle point solution. This completes the proof.
Appendix M. Supremum of strongly convex functions is strongly convex
Lemma 27 s(x) = sup
y∈Y
g(x, y) is σ-strongly convex if g(·, y) is σ-strongly convex for any y ∈ Y .
Proof For any θ = [0, 1] and any w, z ∈ X,
s(θw+ (1− θ)z) = g(θw + (1− θ)z, yˆ)
≤ θg(w, yˆ) + (1− θ)g(z, yˆ)− σ
2
θ(1− θ)‖w − z‖2
≤ θs(w) + (1− θ)s(z)− σ
2
θ(1− θ)‖w − z‖2,
(87)
where the first equality holds for a specific yˆ ∈ Y .
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